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THE COVID-19 VACCINE RACE: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, COLLABORATION(S), 
NATIONALISM AND MISINFORMATION  
Ana Santos Rutschman* 
ABSTRACT 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has brought a national and global vaccine 
race. This Article examines the race with respect to contemporary 
frameworks for biopharmaceutical research and development.  Specifically, 
this Article focuses on the effect of patents, pre-production agreements, 
public-private partnerships, and vaccine misinformation. This Article 
analyzes lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic, advocates for 
promoting vaccine affordability and equity, and suggests modifications to 
existing preparedness frameworks to prepare for upcoming outbreaks of 
infectious disease.  
 
*   Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law, Center for Health Law 
Studies, Center for International and Comparative Law. S.J.D., LL.M., Duke Law School. This essay 
benefited from early-stage discussions at the following events, held remotely due to the COVID-19 
pandemic: the panel on Innovation During COVID-19: From Vaccines to Open-Source Ventilators to 
Homemade Masks, organized by the NYU Law School Engelberg Center on Innovation Law and Policy 
and the R Street Institute; the panel on IP Protection and Access to Medical Technology in Health 
Emergencies, organized by the World Trade Institute in Berne; and the First Mini-Conference on 
Coronavirus and Law, organized by the University of Oklahoma College of Law. I am also grateful to 
Nathan Gardner for outstanding research assistance. 



















Vaccines have long played a crucial role in the prevention, mitigation 
and eradication of infectious diseases.1 More than any other recent outbreak, 
the COVID-19 pandemic has brought the phenomenon of the vaccine race 
to the forefront of personal, national, and global preoccupations. This 
symposium contribution examines the early features and takeaways of the 
COVID-19 vaccine race in four parts. The essay begins by situating the 
ongoing vaccine race into contemporary frameworks for biopharmaceutical 
research and development (R&D). Part II examines the role of proprietary 
and nationalistic modes of vaccine production and distribution, with an 
emphasis on the effects of patents and pre-production agreements on 
distributive outcomes of the COVID-19 vaccine race. Part III then turns to 
emerging efforts to counter overly patent-dependent and nationalistic 
approaches to vaccine R&D. It describes and assesses the role(s) played by 
the World Health Organization, as well as public-private partnerships like 
CEPI (the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations) and Gavi, a 
Geneva-based vaccine procurement organization. Moreover, it offers a case 
study on COVAX, a quasi-global push and pull mechanism designed during 
the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic to promote vaccine 
affordability and equity. Part IV concludes the essay by looking ahead to 
the end of the race and pondering the increasingly salient role of vaccine 
misinformation and disinformation in the uptake of emerging COVID-19 
vaccines.   
 
1.  See, e.g., Walter A. Orenstein & Rafi Ahmed, Simply Put: Vaccination Saves Lives, 114 
PROCS.  NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 4031 (2017); Robert F. Breiman, Vaccines as Tools for Advancing More 
than Public Health: Perspectives of a Former Director of the National Vaccine Program Office, 32 


















I.  THE BEGINNING OF THE VACCINE RACE: INCENTIVES 
FRAMEWORKS AND LINKS WITH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has illustrated the need for the swift 
development of new vaccines targeting emerging pathogens causing 
outbreaks of infectious diseases. Yet, absent a catalyst like a large-scale, 
transnational public health crisis, vaccine R&D is traditionally neither 
particularly fast nor especially well-funded, at least in the case of emerging 
diseases like COVID-19. 
Virologist Stephen Morse coined the term “emerging infectious 
diseases” to designate “infections that have newly appeared in the 
population or are rapidly increasing their incidence or geographic range.”2 
This group of diseases includes many of the pathogens that have recently 
triggered large outbreaks,3 including the 2014–16 Ebola outbreak4 and the 
2015–16 Zika outbreak.5 It also includes viruses in the influenza family,6 as 
well as different types of coronaviruses associated with severe respiratory 
disease, such as MERS7 and SARS8—the latter being the family of diseases 
to which COVID-19 infection belongs, being caused by the SARS-CoV-2 
virus.9 
 
2.  Stephen S. Morse, The Public Health Threat of Emerging Viral Disease, 127 J. NUTRITION 
951S (1997). See also Stephen S. Morse, Factors in the Emergence of Infectious Diseases, 1 EMERGING 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 7 (1995). 
3.  See generally NIAID Emerging Infectious Diseases/Pathogens, NAT’L INST. ALLERGY & 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES (July 26, 2018), https://www.niaid.nih.gov/research/emerging-infectious-
diseases-pathogens [https://perma.cc/P79U-ATNX]. 
4.  See generally Ebola Virus Disease, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/health-
topics/ebola/#tab=tab_1 [https://perma.cc/FWF5-BMPF]. 
5.  See generally Zika Virus: Key Facts, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 20, 2018), 
https://www.who.int/en/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/zika-virus [https://perma.cc/G6VF-8MCA]. 
6.  See Understanding Influenza Viruses, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 10, 
2019), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/viruses/index.htm [https://perma.cc/8QUN-JMXM].  
7.  Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus. See generally Middle East Respiratory 
Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV): Key Facts, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 11, 2019), 
https://www.who.int/en/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/middle-east-respiratory-syndrome-coronavirus-
(mers-cov) [https://perma.cc/7MA8-WJ3G]. 
8.  Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome. See generally Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://www.cdc.gov/sars/index.html [https://perma.cc/M2R7-65GK].  
9.  See Coronaviridae Study Group of the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses, The 
Species Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome-Related Coronavirus: Classifying 2019-nCoV and Naming 
It SARS-CoV-2, 5 NATURE MICROBIOLOGY 536 (2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41564-020-
0695-z [https://perma.cc/K2QX-4C6K]. 

















In the wake of a large 2016 Ebola outbreak, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) published a plan of action—entitled R&D Blueprint—
to increase preparedness for future outbreaks of emerging infectious 
diseases.10 The R&D Blueprint listed coronaviruses as “top emerging 
pathogens likely to cause severe outbreaks in the near future,” and the plan 
grouped them with other viruses that needed to be “urgently addressed.”11 
Additionally, the WHO diagnosed an ongoing “lack of R&D preparedness” 
for diseases like Ebola, which tend to be chronically underfunded areas of 
research.12 These diseases, often referred to as “neglected diseases,” are 
estimated to affect over 1 billion people across the globe.13 Even though 
they exert a heavy toll on public health, funding for R&D nevertheless pales 
in comparison to funding for research on other diseases.14 
  
 
10.  An R&D Blueprint for Action to Prevent Epidemics, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 2016), 
https://www.who.int/blueprint/about/r_d_blueprint_plan_of_action.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/PFE4-
WQPB] [hereinafter R&D Blueprint]. 
11.  Id. at 22. 
12.  Id. at 6, 12. 
13.  Neglected Diseases, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, 
https://rarediseases.info.nih.gov/files/neglected_diseases_faqs.pdf  [https://perma.cc/U7KH-RWTV]. 






















The lack of a robust R&D support system for these diseases entails 
significant opportunity costs—of great consequence for public and global 
health, and especially for populations in economically disadvantaged areas 
of the globe, where neglected diseases have historically been prevalent.16 
Many of the health technologies that, from a scientific and manufacturing 
perspective could be developed before an outbreak occurs, will often go 
undeveloped until a major public health crisis like COVID-19 alters R&D 
priorities. In assessing preparedness for Ebola outbreaks, the WHO noted 
that before the 2014–16 outbreak “[t]here were no vaccines, no treatments, 
few diagnostics, and insufficient medical teams and trained responders.”17 
A similar statement could be made, almost verbatim, in characterizing 
 
15.  Adapted from R&D Blueprint, supra note 10, at 6. 
16.  See, e.g., Peter von Philipsborn et al., Poverty-related and Neglected Diseases – An Economic 
and Epidemiological Analysis of Poverty Relatedness and Neglect in Research and Development, 8 
GLOB. HEALTH ACTION (2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4306754/ 
[https://perma.cc/27GB-QB93]; See also Peter J. Hotez, One World Health: Neglected Tropical 
Diseases in a Flat World, 3 PLOS NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES e405 (2009), 
https://journals.plos.org/plosntds/article?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0000405 [https://perma.cc/V4MQ-
FQ9H] (noting the expansion of the geographical burden of emerging infectious diseases). 



































preparedness for outbreaks caused by coronaviruses.18 This preparedness 
deficit ultimately hampered part of the response to COVID-19.19 
The development of vaccines targeting emerging infectious diseases 
should be understood against this larger R&D backdrop. While 
shortcomings in preparedness frameworks relate to numerous areas—from 
a multiplicity of governmental actions20 once an outbreak occurs to pre-
outbreak interventions by international organizations21—the development 
of health technologies constitutes an integral part of pandemic preparedness 
frameworks and sound public health policies. These technologies are 
heterogenous, ranging from vaccines,22 to diagnostics, personal protective 
drugs, ventilators and other life-support equipment. While this essay 
focuses on vaccines, many of the features of the contemporary pandemic 
vaccine ecosystem replicate themselves elsewhere across the spectrum of 
health-related technologies. Similarly, some of the more hopeful takeaways 
 
18.  See, e.g., Jamison Pike et al., Catastrophic Risk: Waking Up to the Reality of a Pandemic?, 
ECOHEALTH 1 (2020), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32350634/ [https://perma.cc/CE7K-HBA3]. 
See also Stephanie Oum et al., The U.S. Response to Coronavirus: Summary of the Coronavirus 
Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020, KFF (Mar. 11, 2020), 
https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/the-u-s-response-to-coronavirus-summary-of-
the-coronavirus-preparedness-and-response-supplemental-appropriations-act-2020/ 
[https://perma.cc/NTV2-H7P7] (describing early preparedness efforts in the COVID-19 pandemic). 
19.  See, e.g., David P. Fidler, Coronavirus: A Twenty-Year Failure, THINK GLOB. HEALTH (Mar. 
23, 2020), https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/coronavirus-twenty-year-failure 
[https://perma.cc/B2JR-TDWM]; Elizabeth Rosenthal, We Knew the Coronavirus Was Coming, Yet We 
Failed, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/06/opinion/coronavirus-health-
care-market.html [https://perma.cc/U7C2-76JD] (analyzing preparedness failures in the United States); 
Alicia Ault, COVID-19 Exposes Potential Gaps in PPE Training, Effectiveness, MEDSCAPE (Apr. 6, 
2020), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/928163 [https://perma.cc/7SEM-4MNX] (focusing on 
failures related to the use of personal protective equipment). 
20.  Such as the development of public health guidelines or decisions regarding border closures. 
See, e.g., Comparing Nations’ Responses to COVID-19, REG. REV. (Apr. 20, 2020), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2020/04/20/comparing-nations-responses-covid-19/ 
[https://perma.cc/A9UH-KQCV]. 
21.  Such as procurement and/or stockpiling of drugs and vaccines. See, e.g., Procurement 
Mechanisms and Systems, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2018), 
https://www.who.int/immunization/programmes_systems/procurement/mechanisms_systems/en/ 
[https://perma.cc/6STL-SSXR]. 
22.  Vaccines can be used to prevent outbreaks, mitigate their impact and help build herd immunity 
to a specific disease. See Gypsyamber D’Souza & David Dowdy, What is Herd Immunity and How Can 
We Achieve It With COVID-19?, JOHNS HOPKINS SCH. PUB. HEALTH EXPERT INSIGHTS (Apr. 10, 2020), 
https://www.jhsph.edu/covid-19/articles/achieving-herd-immunity-with-covid19.html 
[https://perma.cc/468T-SQ45] (defining herd immunity as large-scale immunity to a pathogen resulting 
in indirect protection to non-immune individuals). But see William Haseltine, We're Wasting Time 



















from the response to COVID-19—described in Part III under the umbrella 
of collaborative approaches to vaccine development and distribution—can 
and possibly should be extended to cover other forms of health technology. 
Questions surrounding levels of investment in biopharmaceutical R&D 
bear a partial yet significant and direct relationship to intellectual property. 
From the twentieth century onwards, pharmaceutical companies—and, 
from its inception in the 1970s, the biotech industry as well—have largely 
operated in a race-to-patent R&D format.23 Under this model, the possibility 
of obtaining a patent serves as an incentive to investment in R&D projects 
deemed especially risky, costly, and time-consuming. According to this 
often-cited strand of intellectual property discourse, one of the primary roles 
of the patent system is thus to provide incentives to overall risky R&D, of 
which pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical are often listed as classical 
examples.24 
In theory, goods with projected limited markets, either numerically or 
temporally, would benefit the most from this catalyzing function of 
intellectual property. Catalyzing effects can be especially valuable for 
public health if the goods in question may lead to an increase in social 
welfare, as is the case with vaccines and other types of health technologies 
needed to prepare for, and respond to, the spread of emerging infectious 
diseases. In practice, nonetheless, a corollary of predominantly patent-
driven R&D models has been the inability of patents to provide meaningful   
incentives to R&D on welfare-enhancing goods like vaccines.25 In previous 
work, I have discussed the main characteristics of vaccines targeting 
emerging infectious diseases that lead to the underfunding of R&D in this 
field26 and noted how the catalyzing moment for vaccine R&D tends to 
 
23.         For an overview of the emergence of the biotech industry, see Ronald Evans & Kenneth Kaitin, 
The Evolution of Biotechnology and Its Impact on Health Care, 34 HEALTH AFF. 210 (2015), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2014.1023 [https://perma.cc/US9Q-JX6Z]. 
24.  See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003). For a criticism of narratives that over-emphasize IP incentives 
frameworks, see, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, Order Without Intellectual Property Law: Open Science in 
Influenza, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1539 (2017); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? 
Accommodating Intellectual Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1437 (2010). 
25.  This problem is not exclusive to vaccines. See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim & Kevin Outterson, 
Fighting Antibiotic Resistance: Marrying New Financial Incentives to Meeting Public Health Goals, 29 
HEALTH AFFS. 1689 (2010). 
26.  See Ana Santos Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines: Takeaways from Recent 
Infectious Disease Outbreaks, 118 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 170 (2020) (noting that vaccines targeting 

















come from outbreaks rather than intellectual property channels.27 
In the case of coronaviruses in the SARS family, which were first 
identified in the early 2000s,28 the first vaccine race was brought about by 
the 2002–04 outbreak, which was caused by the SARS-CoV-1 virus and 
affected over 8,000 people in more than 30 countries, resulting in over 700 
deaths.29 Development of different types of SARS vaccine candidates 
commenced during the outbreak and progressed in the years that followed 
it,30 but quickly thinned out as the virus somewhat uncharacteristically 
disappeared.31 To date, there is no fully developed, tested and approved 
SARS vaccine.32 
However, a closely related virus, SARS-CoV-2, emerged in late 2019, 
originating the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing vaccine race. The 
 
emerging infectious diseases have tendentially smaller average patient populations and repeat consumers 
than drugs targeting more mainstream conditions; further noting that savings to health systems 
attributable to vaccination are notoriously hard to calculate, as they relate to a negative event); See also 
Yaniv Heled et al., The Problem with Relying on Profit-Driven Models to Produce Pandemic Drugs, 7 
J. L. & BIOSCIS. 1 (2020) (arguing that profit-driven R&D models are largely at odds with the 
development of drugs needed during a pandemic). 
27.  Ana Santos Rutschman, IP Preparedness for Outbreak Diseases, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1200, 1203 
(2018). 
28.  Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
https://www.who.int/csr/sars/en/ [https://perma.cc/6YJN-J7N9]. 
29.  See, e.g., Shibo Jiang et al., SARS Vaccine Development, 11 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
1016 (2005), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3371787/ [https://perma.cc/3ZYL-
UDQE] (summarizing the SARS vaccine race); SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/ith/diseases/sars/en/ [https://perma.cc/YZA6-EB37] (describing 
the 2002-04 SARS outbreak); Cumulative Number of Reported Probable Cases of SARS, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/2003_07_11/en/ [https://perma.cc/2L9X-QXEG]; 
SARS 10 Years Later, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 14, 2013), 
https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/page/sars-10th-anniversary [https://perma.cc/4G9N-BAY4] (collectively 
reporting probable SARS-related deaths). 
30.  See generally Deborah R. Taylor, Obstacles and Advances in SARS Vaccine Development, 24 
VACCINE 863 (2006), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7115537/ 
[https://perma.cc/NYV4-FZUS]; Rachel L. Roper & Kristina E. Rehm, SARS Vaccines: Where Are We?, 
8 EXPERT REV. VACCINES 887 (2009), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/706717_1 
[https://perma.cc/K7EH-DM3U]; Jiang et al., supra note 29. 
31.  See, e.g., Wei-Jie Guan et al., Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome: A Vanished Evil?, 5 J. 
THORACIC DISEASE S87 (2013), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3747533/ 
[https://perma.cc/7K96-9UFB]. 
32.  SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), NAT’L HEALTH SYS. (U.K.) (Oct. 24, 2019), 
https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/sars/. During the early stages of COVID-19 vaccine development, there 
was renewed interest in SARS vaccine candidates. See, e.g., Could a Vaccine Candidate for SARS Also 



















magnitude of this vaccine race is unprecedented.33 A few months after the 
World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic,34 there were 
well over 100 different vaccine development projects across the world.35 By 
July 2020, the number had risen to 150, of which 23 had moved on to 
clinical trials.36 As one commentator put it:  
The speed with which this vaccine has been developed is 
remarkable—from publication of the first SARS-CoV-2 
sequences through phase 1 [clinical trials] in 6 months, as 
compared with a typical timeline of 3 to 9 years. . . . The 
world has now witnessed the compression of 6 years of 
work into 6 months.37 
To further put these numbers in perspective, consider the fact that 
players involved in COVID-19 vaccine R&D know that many vaccine 
candidates will never reach phase III clinical trials, and that among those 
which do, many fail.38 The head of the leading vaccine procurement 
international partnership, Gavi,39 recently estimated that only 7% of vaccine 
candidates successfully complete preclinical development, with only 
around 15% to 20% of candidates going through clinical trials receiving 
market approval.40 “Contestants” in the vaccine race thus know that the 
 
33.  See generally Ewen Callaway, The Race for Coronavirus Vaccines: A Graphical Guide, 
NATURE (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01221-y 
[https://perma.cc/M8HC-GBY7]; Caroline Y. Johnson, Inside the Extraordinary Race to Invent a 
Coronavirus Vaccine, WASH. POST (May 3, 2020, 2:57 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/2020/05/02/coronavirus-vaccine/ [https://perma.cc/7B55-
9J3W]. 
34.  Timeline of WHO’s Response to COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jun. 29, 2020), 
https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/29-06-2020-covidtimeline [https://perma.cc/B2D8-SL7B]. 
35.  See, e.g., Jonathan Corum et al., Coronavirus Vaccine Tracker, N.Y. TIMES, 
 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/science/coronavirus-vaccine-tracker.html 
[https://perma.cc/V7RS-2UX8]. 
36.  Id.; see also Jonathan Gardner et al., The Coronavirus Vaccine Frontrunners Have Emerged. 
Here's Where They Stand, BIOPHARMA DRIVE (Jun. 9 2020), 
https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/coronavirus-vaccine-pipeline-types/579122/ [ 
https://perma.cc/4V3H-QZAP].  
37.  Penny M. Heaton, The Covid-19 Vaccine-Development Multiverse, N. ENG. J. MED. (July 14, 
2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMe2025111 [https://perma.cc/UE24-B4CX]. 
38.  Id. 
39.  See infra, Part III. 
40.  See Helen Branswell, WHO, Partners Unveil Ambitious Plan to Deliver 2 Billion Doses of 
Covid-19 Vaccine to High-Risk Populations, STAT (Jun. 26, 2020), 
https://www.statnews.com/2020/06/26/who-partners-unveil-ambitious-plan-to-deliver-2-billion-doses-

















likelihood of market entrance is small and that the vast majority of 
participants will drop out within relatively short timelines. 
Attrition in a vaccine race prompted by a large-scale public health crisis 
is a predictable, and to some extent unavoidable, phenomenon.41 What 
separates the COVID-19 vaccine race from previous races is the sheer 
number of participants, and how quickly discrete multi-party R&D 
collaborations came together: in a paradoxical way, the outbreak of SARS-
CoV-2 eliminated the traditional incentives problem that vaccine R&D 
frameworks often display. Unlikely diseases that slowly build up 
momentum and struggle to attract meaningful funding for the development 
of a new vaccine for years or decades, COVID-19 created a scenario in 
which intellectual property scarcely played a role at the incentives level. 
Yet, intellectual property frameworks—and other tendentially 
proprietary, or rightsholder-centered approaches—still inform this vaccine 
race. The following section explores the role of patents in both the 






















II.  PROPRIETARY APPROACHES TO VACCINE DEVELOPMENT 
AND DISTRIBUTIONS  
 
A. Vaccine Patients and the Covid-19 Race  
 
Some components of vaccine technology elude intellectual property 
protection. The most salient case is perhaps that of standard formulation for 
several vaccines which have been in use for decades and whose formulation 
is no longer covered by patents.42 Examples of standard formulations that 
are no longer subject to proprietary rights include the case of the yellow 
fever, measles, mumps and rubella vaccines.43 
Many of the components of the majority of newly developed vaccines, 
on the other hand, are protectible—and often protected—by one or more 
patents.44 The days of groundbreaking vaccine R&D unencumbered by 
intellectual property frameworks, including the decade in which the first 
polio vaccine was deemed unpatentable by lawyers advising Jonas Salk’s 
team, have been replaced by a patent-intensive culture.45 For instance, 
recently developed vaccines targeting some cervical cancers (HPV vaccines 
like Gardasil) are covered by over 80 patents issued in the United States.46 
Emerging COVID-19 vaccines—or, more precisely, one or more 
components thereof—are thus likely to be covered by proprietary rights. 
Patent protection for these vaccines is also likely to have a near global reach, 
as article 27(1) of the TRIPs Agreement mandates countries to grant patents 
to inventions that are “new, involve an inventive step and are capable of 
industrial application” according to the domestic laws of member states.47 
 
42.  Martin Friede, Intellectual Property and License Management with Respect to Vaccines, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2010), https://www.who.int/phi/news/Presentation15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2PXF-QRRS], at 4. Improved formulations for these vaccines, on the other hand, may 
be—and often are—subject to patent protection. Id. Exceptions to the diminished relevance of 
intellectual property rights over what the World Health Organization designates as “basic vaccines” 
include components used in pertussis and pneumonia vaccines. Id. at 5-6. 
43.  Id. at 4.  
44.  See Ana Santos Rutschman, The Vaccine Race in the 21st Century, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 729 
(2019). 
45.  Id. at 742–43; 745-47; See generally DAVID M. OSHINSKY, POLIO: AN AMERICAN STORY 
(2006). 
46.  Swathi Padmanabhan et al., Intellectual property, technology transfer and manufacture of low-
cost HPV vaccines in India, 28 NATURE BIOTECH. 671 (2010). 
47.  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27(1), Jan. 1, 1995, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299. 

















The exceptions to patentability contemplated in article 27(3) of the 
Agreement—namely, “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the 
treatment of humans or animals”48—fall largely outside the field of vaccine-
related technology. 
As the first set of leading COVID-19 vaccine candidates enters clinical 
trials, the intellectual property landscape associated with these candidates is 
still evolving. There is a time lag between the filing of a patent application 
and publication of said application by national patent offices. For example, 
in the United States, Europe, and Japan, patent applications are published, 
as a general rule, around eighteen months after the date of filing or the 
earliest priority date.49 As such, most of the COVID-19 vaccine race is 
taking place in an environment in which there is some degree of opacity 
regarding the universe of potentially emerging intellectual property rights.50 
It should be noted, however, that this is not a unique feature of the COVID-
19 vaccine race, but rather a feature of patent-driven R&D models and the 
administrative apparatus that supports them. Moreover, in addition to 
classic intellectual property rights in the form of patents, some components 
of vaccine technology and vaccine production—such as manufacturing 
processes and genomic information—may be protected under trade secrecy 
frameworks.51  
 
48.  Id. at 27(3)(a). The additional exceptions to patentability established in article 27(3) relate to 
“plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production 
of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes.” See id. at 27(3)(b). Article 
27(2) further contemplates the possibility of exceptions to patentability rooted in ordre public or 
morality reasons. 
49.  See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(a); EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, EUROPEAN PATENT GUIDE: HOW TO 
GET A EUROPEAN PATENT ch. 5.3.001 (2019), https://www.epo.org/applying/european/Guide-for-
applicants/html/e/ga_c5_3.html [https://perma.cc/5VXN-FL8A]; JAPAN PATENT OFFICE, PROCEDURES 
FOR OBTAINING A PATENT RIGHT (2019), https://www.jpo.go.jp/e/system/patent/gaiyo/patent.html 
[https://perma.cc/85AH-H7YG] (collectively setting publication of patent applications at 18 months 
after the relevant filing or priority date). 
50.  Some of this information has nonetheless begun to emerge. In early June 2020, the Chinese 
National Intellectual Property Administration published the first known patent application directly 
related to a COVID-19 vaccine. See Aaron Wininger, Chinese Patent Application for Coronavirus 
Vaccine Published, NAT’L L. REV. (Jun. 3, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/chinese-
patent-application-coronavirus-vaccine-published [https://perma.cc/S5JL-6TQT].  
51.  See generally UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985); Michael Ricsh, Why 
Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2007); Sharon K. Sandeen, The 
Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When They Do Not Follow the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493 (2010); Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, 
Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829 (2017); Mark A. 


















Even though the intellectual property puzzle surrounding COVID-19 
vaccines remains at this point incomplete, there are already emerging 
questions in the United States about known aspects of patented, federally 
funded vaccine-related research that is relevant to the COVID-19 race. At 
the time of writing, the leading COVID-19 vaccine candidate is the mRNA-
1273 vaccine,52 which was developed by Moderna, a newcomer biotech 
company based in Massachusetts,53 following an early-stage research 
collaboration with the National Institutes of Health (NIH).54 When federal 
agencies like the NIH enter into scientific collaborations with private-sector 
companies or other non-federal research players, the public sector may hold 
certain rights over emerging patentable research.55 Recently, there have 
been indications that the role of the NIH during research on the technology 
that led to the development of mRNA-1273 may confer the Agency an 
“intellectual property stake” in the vaccine, which in turn would have an 
 
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADE SECRET POLICY, https://www.uspto.gov/ip-policy/trade-
secret-policy [https://perma.cc/S43X-AJSG]; see also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 47, at art. 39. (establishing an enabling framework for domestic 
protection of trade secrets); 2016 O.J. (L 157) 1 (providing the legal framework for trade secrecy in the 
European Union). 
52.  Christopher Rowland & Carolyn Y. Johnson, A Coronavirus Vaccine Rooted in a Government 
Partnership is Fueling Financial Rewards for Company Executives, WASH. POST (July 2, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/07/02/coronavirus-vaccine-moderna-rna/ 
[https://perma.cc/NX9Z-SDN8 ] (describing Moderna’s vaccine candidate as “leading the race in the 
United States for a coronavirus vaccine”); Peter Loftus & Gregory Zuckerman, Inside Moderna: The 
Covid Vaccine Front-Runner with No Track Record and an Unsparing CEO, WALL ST. J., (July 1, 2020), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-moderna-the-covid-vaccine-front-runner-with-no-track-record-
and-an-unsparing-ceo-11593615205 [https://perma.cc/QFA7-YAYY]. (calling mRNA-1273 the “Covid 
Vaccine Front-Runner”). For an explanation of how mRNA vaccines work, see Marcus A. Banks, What 
Are mRNA Vaccines, and Could They Work Against COVID-19?, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (July 16, 2020), 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/mrna-vaccines-covid-19-180975330/ 
[https://perma.cc/L2SL-UFFB] (describing mRNA vaccine as “contain[ing] a synthetic version of the 
RNA that a virus uses to form proteins”). For a more technical overview of the underlying technology, 
see Wolfgang W. Leitner et al., DNA and RNA-based Vaccines: Principles, Progress and Prospects, 18 
VACCINE 765 (1999). 
53.  Moderna is a newcomer biotech company based in Massachusetts. MODERNA, 
https://www.modernatx.com [https://perma.cc/XZ9L-VE3C]; see also Loftus & Zuckerman, supra note 
52 (explaining that, although Moderna has no approved products, its structure and capabilities differ 
starkly from those of a start-up newcomer). 
54.  See Ed Silverman, NIH May Own Patents for the Moderna Covid-19 Vaccine; Icer Boosts 
Recommended Price for Remdesivir, STAT (June 25, 2020), 
https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2020/06/25/nih-covid19-coronavirus-vaccine-gilead-remdesivir/ 
[https://perma.cc/8TPH-DK4N].  
55.  See infra notes 57, 64, 69 and 71 and accompanying text. 

















impact on its ultimate commercialization.56 
Federal agencies routinely enter into R&D collaborations with the 
private sector.57 In recent years, NIH and Moderna have worked together on 
a number of both vaccines and coronavirus-related technologies.58 
Documents released in June 2020 by digital news company Axios include 
an agreement regulating the transfer of material related to “mRNA 
coronavirus vaccine candidates developed and jointly owned by NIAID [an 
institute within the NIH structure] and Moderna” to the University of North 
Carolina.59 The agreement is dated December 2019, just before the first 
cases of COVID-19 were reported.60 
Upon reviewing these documents, some commentators and activists 
have posited that the “agreements suggest that NIH has not transferred its 
rights, but instead maintains a joint stake” in the mRNA-1273 vaccine.61 
These commentators further identify two patent applications listing “federal 
scientists as co-inventors” of the vaccine.62 Having reviewed the same 
documents, I merely note that current evidence suggests that the federal 
government might have retained some rights over the vaccine,1 or some 
components thereof. Additionally, as discussed below, a clarification of the 
intellectual property status of mRNA-1273 is necessary, as the possibility 
 
56.  Virtual Signature Event with Dr. Francis Collins, Chris Nassetta, and Mary Brady, ECON. 
CLUB at 3 (May 29, 2020), 
https://www.economicclub.org/sites/default/files/transcripts/Interview%20with%20Collins%20Nassett
a%20Brady%20Edited%20Transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/NU5P-4XVV] [hereinafter Virtual 
Signature Event]; see generally Bob Herman, The NIH Claims Joint Ownership of Moderna's 
Coronavirus Vaccine, AXIOS (Jun. 25, 2020), https://www.axios.com/moderna-nih-coronavirus-
vaccine-ownership-agreements-22051c42-2dee-4b19-938d-099afd71f6a0.html 
[https://perma.cc/R4YL-HN6Z].  
57.  See 15 U.S.C. § 3710a (allowing federal agencies to enter into “cooperative research and 
development agreements”). See also id. § 3710a(d)(1) (defining these agreements as “between one or 
more Federal laboratories and one or more non-Federal parties”). 
58.  See Herman, supra note 56; see also Virtual Signature Event, supra note 56. 
59.  Material Transfer Agreement, NIH at 105, 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6935295/NIH-Moderna-Confidential-Agreements.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NBE4-U9U9 at 105]. 
60.  Id. at 107. 
61.  Zin Rizvi, The NIH Vaccine, PUBLIC CITIZEN (June 25, 2020), 
https://www.citizen.org/article/the-nih-vaccine/ [https://perma.cc/JPS2-UWHK]. 
62.  Id.; see also Kizzmekia S. Corbett et al., SARS-CoV-2 mRNA Vaccine Development Enabled 
by Prototype Pathogen Preparedness, BIORXIV (2020), 
https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.06.11.145920v1.full [https://perma.cc/D4E3-4MNH] 



















of joint ownership triggers licensure and affordability considerations. 
Moreover, the joint ownership possibility appears to be corroborated by a 
quote from NIH Director Francis Collins, who has stated that “we [NIH] do 
have some particular stake in the intellectual property” of Moderna’s 
vaccine candidate.63 
If joint ownership is confirmed, and in the absence of an agreement to 
the contrary, federal patent law enables each joint owner to perform several 
actions—including manufacturing, using or selling the vaccine—without 
the consent of the other.64 If mRNA-1273 maintains its status as the vaccine 
frontrunner,65 the NIH would therefore have ample latitude under this 
provision to take the necessary steps to produce and distribute vaccine doses 
in furtherance of public health principles and goals—namely, first to those 
in greater need and then to indicated populations, and in both cases at 
affordable prices, irrespective of economic ability. Some commentators 
have suggested that the NIH should share mRNA-1273 “intellectual 
property and know-how with the World Health Organization,”66 which is 
currently co-coordinating the development of a risk-sharing and 
procurement mechanism for emerging COVID-19 vaccines, more fully 
described in Part III.A. This possibility, however, seems at odds with the 
isolationist policies of the current administration, which set in motion the 
withdrawal of the United States from the World Health Organization in July 
2020.67 
Independently from the joint ownership possibility, if NIH has provided 
funding for the development of mRNA-1273,68 federal patent law gives the 
 
63.  See Virtual Signature Event, supra note 56, at 3. 
64.  See 35 U.S.C. § 262 (“In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, each of the joint owners 
of a patent may make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented invention within the United States, or import 
the patented invention into the United States, without the consent of and without accounting to the other 
owners.”). 
65.  Early clinical test results have been encouraging. See Lisa A. Jackson et al., An mRNA Vaccine 
Against SARS-CoV-2 — Preliminary Report, N. ENGL. J. MED. (July 14, 2020), 
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/nejmoa2022483 [https://perma.cc/23WB-KHH9]. 
66.  See Rizvi, supra note 61. 
67.  See, e.g., Emily Rauhala et al., Trump Administration Sends Letter Withdrawing U.S. from 




68.  Based on publicly available information at the time of writing, it is impossible to ascertain the 
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government the ability to take several steps to ensure that the vaccine is 
widely made available and that it is priced affordably.69 For example, if 
Moderna were unable to produce sufficient vaccine doses or if the vaccine 
was priced unaffordably,70 the Patent Code gives funding agencies march-
in rights, which NIH could potentially exercise to issue non-exclusive 
licenses to other manufacturers.71  
Nevertheless, the options outlined in the preceding paragraphs would 
require government interventions that face significant political economy 
challenges extending well beyond the idiosyncrasies of the current 
administration. For example, march-in rights have not been used in the forty 
years that have passed since the Bayh-Dole Act introduced them.72 This 
historical reluctance in terms of governmental interventions aimed at 
ultimately guaranteeing the availability and/or affordability of drugs has in 
recent years crept into the field of emerging vaccines.73 Most recently, when 
asked during a congressional hearing whether coronavirus vaccines would 
be priced affordably in the United States, Secretary of Health and Human 
Services Alex Azar stated: “[W]e [the government] can't control that price, 
because we need the private sector to invest. Price controls won't get us 
there.”74  
This statement—which disregards the legal tools available to the 
 
69.  Over the past few years, the growing scholarly attention has also focused on 28 U.S.C. § 1498, 
which allows the government to buy generic medicines in exchange for the payment of a reasonable 
royalty. Recent work by scholar Amy Kapczynski and colleagues has illustrated how this provision can 
be applied to expand access to, and guarantee affordability of, hepatitis C drugs, laying out a pathway 
that could be potentially applicable to emerging vaccines. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498; Hannah Brennan et al., 
A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent Use for Health, 18 YALE J. 
L. & TECH (2017). 
70.  Moderna has stated that it is on track to produce between 500 million and 1 billion doses 
annually. See, e.g., Eric Sagonowsky, Moderna Has Started Turning Out Covid-19 Vaccine Doses for 
Quick Shipment if Approved, FIERCE PHARMA (July 15, 2020), 
https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/moderna-has-started-producing-commercial-covid-19-
vaccines-at-risk-ceo [https://perma.cc/G7EG-4GPS]. 
71.  35 U.S.C. § 203. 
72.  See generally Ryan Whalen, The Bayh–Dole Act & Public Rights in Federally Funded 
Inventions: Will the Agencies Ever Go Marching In?, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 1083 (2015). 
73.  See Ana Santos Rutschman, Vaccine Licensure in the Public Interest: Lessons from the 
Development of the U.S. Army Zika Vaccine, 127 YALE L.J. F. 651 (2018) (providing an overview of the 
relationship between intellectual property and vaccine affordability issues during the 2015–16 Zika 
outbreak). 
74.  Nicole Wetsman, Health Secretary Alex Azar Won’t Promise that a Coronavirus Vaccine 
Would be Affordable, VERGE (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/2/27/21155879/alex-


















government to ensure drug and vaccine affordability—harks back to notions 
of intellectual property as incentives to R&D.75 It illustrates how reliance 
on patents and other proprietary frameworks has come to dominate the 
innovation processes that lead to the production and distribution of public 
health goods. Elsewhere, I have made the argument that vaccines targeting 
emerging infectious diseases, in particular, are best understood as global 
public goods.76 Yet, the current proprietary ethos undergirding the 
development and distribution of vaccines is scarcely compatible with global 
needs and transnational public health. While so far, the essay has focused 
primarily on the case of the United States and its patent law framework, the 
problems posed by siloed approaches to vaccine development and 
distribution are global and increasingly stretching into intellectual property-
adjacent fields. In the following section, the essay transitions to a less 
United States-centric view of these problems by briefly describing the 
problem of vaccine nationalism as a global phenomenon. Part III will then 
provide an overview of emerging solutions designed to counter the 
combination of both intellectual property and nationalistic frameworks. 
 
B. Vaccine Nationalism  
 
The expression “vaccine nationalism” made it into popular press 
headlines during the COVID-19 pandemic.77 It refers to attempts by some 
countries to secure doses of emerging COVID-19 vaccines for their own 
populations—generally to the detriment of indicated populations elsewhere 
in the world.78  
While vaccine nationalism affects distributive outcomes after R&D is 
complete, it is enabled by behaviors that take place during the vaccine R&D 
stages: countries use advance commitment agreements, also known as pre-
production agreements, to reserve a substantial amount of vaccine early on 
during a vaccine race.79 They place these orders before vaccines are fully 
 
75.  Supra, Part I. 
76.  Ana Santos Rutschman, The Reemergence of Vaccine Nationalism, GEO. J. INT'L AFFS. (July 
3, 2020), https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2020/07/03/the-reemergence-of-vaccine-nationalism/ 
[https://perma.cc/NK73-3J4K].  
77.  See, e.g., Greg Myre, In the Battle Against COVID-19, a Risk of 'Vaccine Nationalism, NPR 
(May 27, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/27/861886520/in-the-battle-against-covid-19-a-risk-of-
vaccine-nationalism [https://perma.cc/MTQ9-UAZV]; Loftus & Zuckerman, supra note 52.  
78.  Rutschman, supra note 76.  
79.  It should be noted that vaccine nationalism is not a new phenomenon. See Rutschman, supra 

















developed, tested and approved by the relevant regulatory authorities, such 
as the Food and Drug Administration in the United States or the European 
Medicines Agency, with the goal of guaranteeing access to successful 
vaccines as soon as possible.80  
The manufacturer(s) of the first COVID-19 vaccine(s) that eventually 
come to market will have the ability to produce larges quantities of vaccine, 
but not nearly as much as is needed by all the indicated populations across 
the globe.81 The growing use of advance commitment agreements means 
that in practice, a reduced number of countries—those with greater 
economic power82—are able to reserve most of the early supply of vaccines 
for themselves. 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, several developed countries placed 
pre-production orders directly with different pharmaceutical companies 
working on leading vaccine candidates.83 At the same time, as further 
detailed in Part III.A, international actors like the World Health 
Organization, as well as vaccine development and procurement 
organizations, have been working to build an inclusive global network for 
the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines.84 Widespread use of bilateral 
contractual mechanisms largely undermines attempts to treat vaccines as 
global public goods, as well as the development of equitable distribution 
frameworks for newly developed vaccines outside nationalistic 
frameworks. In the ongoing pandemic, this risk is exacerbated by flaws in 
 
note 76 (describing the use of advance commitment agreements in the 2009 H1N1 vaccine race). See 
also Sam F. Halabi & Ana Santos Rutschman, From Viral Sovereignty to Vaccine Nationalism: Lessons 
for the Post-COVID-19 World  (forthcoming, 2021); Sam F. Halabi, Viral Sovereignty, Intellectual 
Property, and the Changing Global System for Sharing Pathogens for Infectious Disease Research, 28 
ANNALS HEALTH L. 101 (2019); Peter K. Yu, Virotech Patents, Viropiracy, and Viral Sovereignty, 45 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1563 (2013). A related strand of scholarship has framed these issues of the securitization 
of infectious diseases; see Stefan Elbe & Nadine Voelkner, Viral Sovereignty: The Downside Risks of 
Securitizing Infectious Disease, THE HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL HEALTH POLICY 305 (Garrett W. Brown 
et al. eds., 2014). Moreover, vaccine nationalism can be inscribed into larger R&D frameworks, which 
one legal scholar has aptly described as “innovation nationalism.” See Sapna Kumar, Innovation 
Nationalism, 51 CONN. L. REV. 205, 208–09 (2019) (observing that “[t]he U.S. patent system is 
intertwined with economic nationalism, beyond simple protectionism” and further noting that “[b]ecause 
patent law is not subject to the high degree of harmonization that exists for copyrights and trademarks, 
the U.S. government can formulate domestic patent law to protect its strongest industries, such as 
pharmaceutical drug manufacturing”). 
80.  See Rutschman, supra note 76.  
81.  See infra, Part III.A. 
82.  Rutschman, supra note 76. 
83.  Id.  


















the design of the global network which, as explained in Part III.B, offers a 
two-tiered vaccine distribution scheme based on financial metrics rather 
than public health needs.85 In so doing, it further accentuates the economic 
and social divide between higher and lower-income countries. 
In the case of some countries, nationalistic strategies exceed the 
contractual domain and translate into other forms of non-cooperative 
behavior at the transnational level. During the early stages of the COVID-
19 vaccine race, several countries elected not to be part of international 
vaccine-related discussions and negotiations. For example, in May 2020, 
the European Union hosted a meeting to discuss equitable development and 
distribution of COVID-19 vaccines; the United States, Russia, India, Brazil 
and Argentina decided not to participate. 86 
Nationalism thus adds yet another layer of commodification and 
privatization to the production and distribution of new vaccines—beyond 
those already inculcated into vaccine R&D through adherence to a patent-
based format for the development of new vaccines or components thereof. 
In so doing, and without an actionable misuse of any international or 
domestic laws or legal instruments, it prolongs and enhances longstanding 
inequalities separating the Global South from the Global North. 
Finally, vaccine nationalism is not merely detrimental to populations in 
the Global South. It may prove short-sighted within the countries that opt 
for siloed approaches to vaccine distribution. Keeping in mind the 
possibility that governments like that of the United States might not 
intervene if a new vaccine is priced too high, economically disadvantaged 
populations at the domestic level also stand to lose from contractual 
bilateralism.87 Already in the ongoing pandemic, data shows that the most 
vulnerable populations in the United States are the ones facing the greatest 
burden from COVID-19.88 So far, there is only one drug treating COVID-
 
85.  See Rutschman, supra note 76 (further explaining how, during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, 
developed countries reserved the entirety of vaccine doses that was logistically possible to produce and 
only moved to donate vaccines to developing countries once it became clear that the magnitude of the 
pandemic was considerably less severe than originally anticipated—at which point, demand for 
vaccines, even in the developing world, had already declined). 
86.  Richard Milne & David Crow, Why Vaccine ‘Nationalism’ Could Slow Coronavirus Fight, 
FIN. TIMES (May 13, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/6d542894-6483-446c-87b0-96c65e89bb2c 
[https://perma.cc/B3DU-7WGB] (further noting that China sent its EU ambassador, instead of “a head 
of state or government like other countries). 
87.  See Rutschman, supra note 76.  
88.  See, e.g., Maria Godoy, What Do Coronavirus Racial Disparities Look Like State by State?, 

















19—remdesivir, as yet unapproved—for which pricing details have been 
made available: in June 2020, California-based pharmaceutical company 
Gilead announced that a full course of treatment would cost Medicaid, 
Medicare and privately insured patients in the United States $3,120.89 In 
other developed countries, remdesivir will be sold at a 25%-discounted 
price.90 The company also announced that the price in developing countries 
would be “substantially lower,” without offering further information.91 
The pricing of remdesivir—a potentially life-saving drug which was 
partly developed through funding and involvement of the public sector92—
has received substantial criticism.93 Yet, no changes to the prices announced 
in June are expected to occur. Access to this drug will therefore be more 
challenging—and in some cases outright impossible—for underinsured and 
non-insured populations, which include a disproportionate number of Black 
and Latino communities.94  
If a problem of excessive pricing arises in a country with a 
predominantly nationalistic approach to vaccine distribution, there is a risk 
that vulnerable populations will face increased economic challenges in 
obtaining access to a vaccine. It is also possible that many indicated 
individuals will be unable to afford it.  
Given the extraordinarily high degree of attention that vaccine-related 
issues have attracted during the COVID-19 pandemic, it is likely that 
overpricing may become less of a problem for vaccines than for 
pharmaceutical products, such as remdesivir. However, as policy makers 
 
NPR (May 30, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/05/30/865413079/what-do-
coronavirus-racial-disparities-look-like-state-by-state [https://perma.cc/D2RH-FJA7] (reporting that 
Black and Latino populations “bear the brunt” of COVID-19 in the United States). 
89.  See Matthew Herper, Gilead Announces Long-Awaited Price for Covid-19 Drug Remdesivir, 
STAT (June 29, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/06/29/gilead-announces-remdesivir-price-
covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/8FJS-8MEB]. If the drug is obtained through the Department of Veterans 
Affairs and the Indian Health Service, a division of the Department of Health and Human Services, the 
price tag will be $2,340. Id.; see also Hannah Denham et al., Gilead Sets Price of Coronavirus Drug 
Remdesivir at $3,120 as Trump Administration Secures Supply for 500,000 Patients, WASH. POST (June 
29, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/29/gilead-sciences-remdesivir-cost-
coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/R2GS-RAYB]. 
90.  Hannah Denham, supra note 89.  
91.  Id.  
92.  For a case study on the development of remdesivir, see Heled et al., supra, note 26.   
93.  See, e.g., Rohan Chalasani & Wallid Gellad, The US Is Paying Way Too Much for Remdesivir, 
WIRED (July 17, 2020 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/the-us-is-paying-way-too-much-for-
remdesivir/ [https://perma.cc/TW38-4KNJ]. 


















begin to consider ways in which to improve both domestic and international 
vaccine policies, current nationalistic frameworks—and the inequitable 
behaviors they potentially enable—should be closely examined. More 
broadly, the current blend of intellectual property and vaccine nationalism 
raises recurring affordability and equity concerns that, if left unaddressed, 
will likely reemerge in future public health crises.95  
The essay now turns to emerging efforts to address the current 
shortcomings in the vaccine development and distribution ecosystem. These 
efforts aim to address both insufficiencies at the funding and R&D levels, 
as well as ongoing problems with equitable distribution of vaccines outside 
nationalistic frameworks. 
 
III. COLLABORATIVE VACCINE R&D: EMERGING SOLUTIONS  
 
A. Public-Private Partnerships: CEPI, GAVI and COVAX 
 
One of the emerging responses to the limitations of the current R&D 
incentives landscape for vaccines targeting emerging infectious diseases—
or otherwise underfunded areas in vaccinology—has been the formation of 
public-private partnerships.96 These partnerships alter the incentives 
landscape by functioning either as push mechanisms (product development 
partnerships) or pull mechanisms (procurement or access partnerships). 
Product development partnerships are typically non-profit organizations 
designed to fund and coordinate R&D, or a segment thereof, from basic 
research to clinical testing, extending possibly into licensure or 
manufacturing of a product.97 Access partnerships are non-profit 
organizations that focus on the purchase (often pre-purchase) of developed 
products, operating as coordinators and possibly negotiators between 
funders, country-level purchasers and manufacturers.98 In the health and 
pharmaceutical space—and especially in the field of vaccines—many of 
 
95.  In the same way that vaccine nationalism in 2020 is a replica of vaccine nationalism during the 
2009 H1N1 pandemic. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
96.  See generally CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY GOVERNANCE, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (Margaret Chon et al., eds. 2018) 
[hereinafter CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK]; JON F. MERZ, WORLD HEALTH ORG., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (2005) (focusing on product 
development partnerships). 
97.  MERZ, supra note 96, at 2. 
98.  Id.  

















these partnerships have traditionally targeted economically disadvantaged 
markets and populations, particularly in the Global South.99 
While public-private partnerships operating in the health space have 
proliferated throughout the first two decades of the twenty-first century,100 
very few have worked primarily in vaccine development or distribution. The 
most notable exception is Gavi, a Switzerland-based public-private 
partnership created in 2000 and entirely focused on vaccine supply and 
procurement.101 In contrast, the first large-scale product development 
partnership focused solely on vaccines did not emerge until 2017: the 
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) came together as 
a direct response to many of the vaccine R&D gaps evidenced by the 2014–
16 Ebola outbreak, and focuses specifically on vaccines targeting emerging 
infectious diseases. 102 CEPI is currently funded by ten countries, the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Wellcome Trust in the United Kingdom, 
and the European Commission.103 
Both Gavi and CEPI became key players early on in the COVID-19 
vaccine race. As early as January 2020—two weeks after essential genomic 
information about the novel coronavirus was first made available to the 
scientific community104—CEPI started three funding programs to speed the 
development of vaccine candidates.105 At this point, CEPI relied 
significantly on pre-existing relationships with several players in vaccine 
R&D,106 including Inovio, which had been funded by CEPI since April 2018 
 
99.  Id. 
100.  See generally Roy Widdus, Public-private Partnerships for Health: Their Main Targets, Their 
Diversity, and Their Future Directions, 79 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 713 (2001). See also 
Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines: Takeaways From Recent Infectious Disease 
Outbreaks, 118 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 170 (2020).  
101. . About Our Alliance, GAVI, https://www.gavi.org/our-alliance/about [https://perma.cc/855Y-
F4MB]; Market Shaping, GAVI, https://www.gavi.org/our-alliance/market-shaping 
[https://perma.cc/4GZD-86P9].  
102.  Why We Exist, CEPI, https://cepi.net/about/whyweexist/ [https://perma.cc/V72N-KY9D]. 
103.  Who We Are, CEPI, https://cepi.net/about/whoweare/ [https://perma.cc/F4KN-EANN]. 
104.  Jon Cohen, Chinese Researchers Reveal Draft Genome of Virus Implicated in Wuhan 
Pneumonia Outbreak, SCI. (Jan. 11, 2020, 3:00 PM), 
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/01/chinese-researchers-reveal-draft-genome-virus-implicated-
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for work on vaccines targeting MERS and Lassa fever.107 But it also entered 
into an agreement with a new partner, Moderna, funding development of a 
vaccine that Moderna had previously designed in collaboration with the 
Vaccine Research Center (VRC) at the National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases (NIAID).108 By July 2020, CEPI had  become one of the 
major funders of the COVID-19 vaccine R&D, having raised $1.4 billion.109 
At the time of writing, if a CEPI-sponsored vaccine receives market 
approval, CEPI and its partners project having two to three manufacturing 
vaccine plants per vaccine, and eight to ten regional distribution sites, for 
an estimated production capacity of at least two billion doses of vaccine by 
late 2021.110  
CEPI is by no means the sole product development public-private 
partnership involved in this vaccine race—although it is the only one 
entirely focused on vaccine R&D—nor the largest COVID-19 vaccine R&D 
funder. The United States government, for instance, awarded 
pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca $1.2 billion to develop an adenovirus 
vaccine,111 and a partnership between AstraZeneca and the University of 
Oxford moved this vaccine candidate into phase II clinical trials in late 
May.112 The United States has also funded several other vaccine candidates 
in smaller amounts, bringing its total estimated investment to over $3 
billion.113 However, when considered alongside longstanding funders of 
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R&D on emerging or neglected diseases, such as national governments or 
the philanthropic sector, CEPI does illustrate the growing capacity of newer 
models of promoting and expediting R&D on traditionally underfunded 
diseases. Moreover, the role played by CEPI emphasizes the importance of 
international collaborations—and the need for expanded modes of 
international governance—in the development and production of new 
vaccines. And while vaccines are an exemplary case in point when 
discussing the health, techno-scientific and economic challenges posed by 
emerging infectious diseases, they are not the only area in which existing 
R&D incentives models have recently been complemented through the 
creation of large-scale product development public-private partnerships. In 
the related area of antibacterial drug resistance,114 a large-scale public-
private partnership, Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria 
Biopharmaceutical Accelerator (CARB-X), was founded in 2016 in Boston 
and raised $500 million for the 2016–2021 period.115 
In addition to drawing increased attention to vaccine development 
issues, COVID-19 has shed light on the importance of addressing 
distributive problems at the end of the R&D pipeline early on during an 
outbreak.116 Vaccine manufacturing, distribution, pricing, and equitable 
access frameworks are intertwined both contractually and from a policy 
perspective.117 For the past two decades, much of the vaccine procurement 
for childhood vaccines needed in developing countries has been performed 
by access public-private partnership Gavi, which has introduced 496 
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vaccines and contributed to the vaccination of 760 million children.118 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Gavi entered into procurement 
agreements reserving vaccine doses to populations in both developing and 
developed countries, setting up the process of what might become the 
largest vaccine procurement scheme in history.119 It did so through the 
formation of the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access Facility (COVAX), 
which, in addition to a procurement mechanism, functions as a resource-
pooling, risk-sharing and push financing mechanism on a nearly global 
level.120  
COVAX offers participants the possibility to place advance 
commitment orders for pre-established doses of COVID-19 vaccine in 
exchange for a financial contribution.121 COVAX procures pre-defined 
quantities of vaccine doses from pharmaceutical companies, which in turn 
have an incentive to engage in at-risk manufacturing of vaccines, reserving 
sufficient doses to meet COVAX commitments.122 If a given vaccine is 
successfully approved by regulatory authorities and becomes commercially 
available, countries that have joined COVAX will receive a share of 
available doses.123  
Because COVAX negotiates high-volume orders, the price paid by 
participating countries will in all likelihood be lower than the price paid by 
countries that elect to negotiate directly with individual vaccine 
manufacturers.124 As such, COVAX is designed to promote vaccine 
affordability.125 
 COVAX is also designed to reduce the risk associated with predicting 
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which vaccine candidates will eventually come to market and avoid “all 
eggs in one basket” problems. At the time COVAX was announced, there 
were 16 vaccine candidates in clinical trials and at least 125 in pre-clinical 
stages.126 COVAX works with multiple vaccine manufacturers.127 From a 
probabilistic perspective, a country that decides to negotiate individually 
with one or two manufacturers instead of joining COVAX has an overall 
lower chance of picking the right vaccine(s). This problem is more acute in 
the case of countries with limited financial capacity, as further discussed in 
the following section. As Gavi has put it, 
through portfolio diversification, pooling of financial and 
scientific resources, and economies of scale, participating 
governments and blocs can hedge the risk of backing 
unsuccessful candidates just as governments with limited 
or no ability to finance their own bilateral procurement can 
be assured access to life-saving vaccines that would 
otherwise have been beyond their reach.128 
COVAX was designed in May 2020.129 Gavi announced the advance 
market commitment option in June.130 By mid-July, 75 countries had 
submitted expressions of interest and indicated that they would self-fund 
their participation.131 Additionally, 90 lower-income countries are eligible 
for financial assistance in joining COVAX, bringing the expected number 
of participants to over 150.132 Since the advance market commitment 
mechanism is open to any and all countries wishing to participate—and 
given the significant number of countries signaling they will make use of 
it—COVAX has emerged as the main international forum for, among other 
things, the coordination of vaccine distribution and the setting of quasi-
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global access frameworks to emerging vaccines.133 In this sense, COVID-
19 helps make the case that non-nationalistic approaches to vaccine 
distribution are not only preferable, but possible. While the following 
section delves into the shortcomings of current distributive solutions, 
including several ongoing (and likely structural) limitations of COVAX, the 
pandemic has shown that the advance commitment model is scalable, at 
least to some extent. The model relies squarely on the same type of legal 
instruments that are used to pursue nationalistic approaches—advance 
commitment agreements between governments and vaccine manufacturers, 
mediated in the case of COVAX by a third set of players situated 
internationally.  
Questions of scalability and geopolitical preference for predominantly 
nationalistic or non-nationalistic models will continue to play out after the 
end of the current pandemic. But it is worth noting that these discussions 
should not be pared down to a focus on domestic frameworks versus 
COVAX-like collaborations: the COVAX model already coexists with 
additional efforts from national governments to secure vaccine doses from 
leading manufacturers in the race.134 Rather, the expedited creation of 
COVAX underscores the longstanding need to broaden procurement 
models beyond the remedial circumstances of outbreak response and 
management. 
Moreover, the specific institutional placement of COVAX provides 
relevant design clues for more permanent solutions to problems surrounding 
vaccine development and distribution. COVAX does not operate as a stand-
alone program. It is integrated into a broader structure in which CEPI and 
the World Health Organization play separate but complementary roles. This 
structure is known as the “vaccines pillar” of the Access to Covid-19 Tools 
(ACT) Accelerator, a network of international heterogenous actors in the 
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global health space, from international organizations to private-sector 
companies.135 This network defines itself as “time-limited” and as having 
“the shared aim of equitable global access to innovative tools for COVID-
19 for all.”136 In addition to its work on vaccines, the two other pillars of the 
Accelerator are diagnostics and therapeutics.137 The vaccines pillar is 
divided into three workstreams: CEPI coordinates vaccine “development 
and manufacturing,” the World Health Organization oversees “policy and 
allocation” issues, and Gavi is responsible for “procurement and delivery 
at-scale.”138 COVAX is housed under Gavi’s workstream. As far as it is 
possible to extract any lessons at this stage of the pandemic, the quick 
mobilization of players and resources to form COVAX, as well as its ability 
to tap into pre-existing commercial and funding channels, seems to indicate 
that there are advantages to further embedding vaccine procurement into 
end-to-end vaccine development and distribution approaches.  
At an even broader level, the case for the globalization of vaccine 
distribution and access will be made stronger if the COVAX procurement 
pathway proves to be successful. I argue that, at a minimum, the recent 
emergence of CEPI and COVAX suggests that the possibility of greater 
centralization and internationalization of vaccine development and 
procurement warrants deeper exploration beyond the temporally limited 
initiatives that have arisen in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Reliance on gargantuan international organizations like the World Health 
Organization, or smaller transnational structures like public-private 
partnerships, is not exempt from faults, as discussed in the following 
section. However, in the fragmented universe of vaccine innovation, such 
reliance is likely preferable to the disjointed and increasingly siloed modes 
of vaccine development and distribution in the field of emerging infectious 
diseases.  
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B. Lingering Problems with Emerging Solutions 
 
While the developments identified in the previous section can be 
considered as generally positive steps towards addressing some of the 
recurring problems in vaccine innovation, the essay here introduces a brief 
note on the limitations of these solutions—and in particular of those that 
were induced by the pandemic. 
A first line of limitations is of temporal nature. As noted above, the 
COVID-19 Accelerator was conceived as a time-limited endeavor. Many of 
its components, including COVAX, were not designed as permanent 
structures. It is too soon to assess whether they might outlast the current 
pandemic—and if they do, under what terms. 
Temporal limitations are not negligible. They are partly a symptom of 
structural shortcomings in global vaccine governance. COVAX, for 
instance, constitutes a short-term solution to a recurring problem. From a 
policy perspective, the response to future outbreaks should rely 
predominantly on permanent mechanisms that adjust to specific crises 
rather than hastily crafted remedies to problems that abruptly erupt as a 
public health crisis unfolds. 
Many public-private partnerships face different problems linked to 
permanency issues, which are intertwined with funding considerations. 
CEPI appears poised to become not only a permanent fixture in the vaccine 
R&D ecosystem, but also one with a growing footprint. In the world of 
health-oriented public-private partnerships, this is not necessarily always 
the case.139 Smaller partnerships, especially those relying heavily on 
philanthropic funding, regularly experience problems related to donor 
fatigue.140 Their strategic planning and budgeting does not often extend 
beyond short- or mid-term frameworks. Consider the case of the Innovative 
Medicines Initiative (IMI), a large partnership between the European Union 
and the pharmaceutical industry:141 IMI1 lasted from 2008 to 2013, and 
IMI2 from 2014 to 2020.142 
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In addition to permanency and funding constraints, a second line of 
limitations of emerging solutions in the vaccine space relates to structural 
concerns increasingly associated with the proliferation of public-private 
partnerships.143 While in this essay I do not have the opportunity to delve 
into the respective literature, it would be remiss not to highlight the main 
recurring concerns. 
A growing strand of commentators have diagnosed bargaining 
asymmetries within different players in a given partnership—and especially 
between players on opposite sides of the public-private divide.144 
Commentators have further noted that a large breadth of players may lead 
to coordination inefficiencies;145 that new collaborative relationships may 
lead some of the participants to underestimate or miscalculate transaction 
costs;146 that information related to intellectual property and knowledge-
sharing obligations attaching to products developed by these partnerships is 
often “vague;”147 and that there might be potentially uncharted effects as 
these partnerships take on actual and symbolic tasks that have in recent 
history fallen to international organizations and national governments.148  
Finally, it is worth noting that while the solutions described in the essay 
constitute direct responses to significant problems in vaccine R&D, 
manufacturing and distributions, they will not necessarily translate into 
equitable access to emerging COVID-19 vaccines. The example of COVAX 
is, once again, illustrative. Even though COVAX was expressly created with 
the purpose of promoting “equal access” to vaccines for populations in both 
developing and developed countries,149 documentation released in June 
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2020 showed that the current COVAX allocation policy distinguishes 
between two categories of countries:150 countries that are able to meet the 
financial requirement by self-funding their participation in COVAX, a 
group that consists of high-income and upper middle-income countries;151 
and countries that will be funded to participate in COVAX, a group that 
consists of lower middle-income and low-income countries.152 Once 
COVID-19 vaccines become available, fully self-funded countries will 
receive doses of vaccine to cover twenty percent of their population, which 
they are free to distribute domestically according to their own sets of 
priorities.153 Funded countries, on the other hand, will receive vaccine doses 
which must be “allocated across them using [forthcoming] guidance from 
the global allocation frame work under development by WHO.”154 
Moreover, the policy shrinks the ability of countries with lesser developed 
economies to pursue multiple vaccine purchase or pre-purchase pathways, 
a requirement that is not imposed on self-funded countries: 
if a country in this group [funded countries] successfully 
concludes a bilateral deal and receives enough doses to 
cover e.g. 20% of their population, the Facility [COVAX] 
requests that these countries delay receipt of any additional 
doses from the Facility until all other Facility country 
participants have received enough supply to also cover their 
highest priority populations.155 
This differentiation between countries based on economic purchasing 
power is far from conducive to a global equitable distribution framework. 
In fact, it drives a wedge into economic fissures separating countries in the 
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prioritization of financial metrics over global public health, the current 
embodiment of COVAX’s policy establishes that self-funded countries are 
“encouraged (but not required) to donate vaccines if they have more than 
they need,”156 a provision which once again runs counter to the goals of 
equity and ample access to emerging vaccines across the world. Unlike 
some of the structural issues described earlier in this section, at least some 
of the inequality-perpetuating features of COVAX’s policy could, and 
should, be corrected during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
IV. AT THE END OF THE VACCINE RACE: NASCENT 
PROBLEMS POSED BY VACCINE MISINFORMATION AND 
DISINFORMATION 
 
The COVID-19 vaccine race will be won by innovators who 
successfully bring novel vaccines to market, as well as the institutions and 
people who support them in multiple ways. Yet, from a public health 
perspective, the vaccine race will come meaningfully to an end when 
resulting vaccines are administered to those who need them—much like 
what happened with the polio vaccine race in the mid-twentieth century, 
leading to a 99% reduction in the incidence of the disease.157 Unlike the 
years preceding the near-eradication of polio, during which there was a 
strong vaccine uptake, it is far from clear that COVID-19 vaccines will be 
as widely accepted by indicated populations as necessary to achieve herd 
immunity.158  
A recent survey reported that only half of Americans responded that 
they planned to receive the vaccine, if one were developed.159 The rejection 
of a recommended vaccine by an individual is one of the facets of vaccine 
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hesitancy, a concept defined as the “reluctance or refusal to vaccinate 
despite the availability of vaccines.”160 In 2019, the World Health 
Organization named vaccine hesitancy as one of the top ten threats to global 
health.161 While addressing topics related to vaccine hesitancy far exceeds 
the purpose of this work, I conclude by noting that the ultimate outcome of 
the COVID-19 vaccine race might depend almost as much on vaccine 
acceptance as it does on the articulation of complex scientific, legal, and 
institutional interactions.  
Over the last few years, vaccine hesitancy has been on the rise across 
the world, including developed countries in the West.162 While this rise is 
attributable to several factors,163 a recent development that has reshaped and 
increased hesitancy boundaries has been the propagation of misinformation 
and disinformation in the online environment.164  
Misinformation and disinformation both relate to the propagation of 
“false or misleading content.”165 Misinformation is an umbrella expression 
for “incorrect information,” irrespective of the intention of the 
propagator.166 The concept of disinformation is increasingly treated 
separately by commentators and policymakers to refer to instances in which 
inaccurate information is circulated with the specific aim of sowing doubt 
or increasing disagreements between people or institutions with different 
viewpoints.167 In the case of vaccines, the circulation of misinformation and 
disinformation has increased exponentially as social media usage has 
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become more common.168  
An even more recent twist in the field of vaccine-specific online 
disinformation has been the use of malicious software to automatize anti-
vaccine or vaccine-questioning discourses, especially among users of social 
media in the United States.169 In one case, online bots that were traced back 
to Russia were spreading both pro- and anti-vaccine content on Twitter as a 
way to bolster discord among Americans.170 
While problems related to the propagation of inaccurate information 
have long plagued the twin fields of vaccines and vaccination—more so 
than most other fields of medical or health technologies171—I would submit 
that COVID-19 triggered the first vaccine race fully immersed in far-
reaching, globalized misinformation and disinformation, particularly in the 
online environment.172 Researchers in the relatively new fields of online 
vaccine misinformation and disinformation have asked for “more research . 
. . to determine how best to combat bot-driven content.”173 While scholars 
and policymakers explore possible solutions to these emerging problems, it 
is perhaps useful to keep in mind that vaccine races have become 
increasingly intertwined with extra-scientific, extra-legal and extra-
economic considerations. The recent growth of vaccine hesitancy and the 
emergence of online vaccine misinformation and disinformation illustrate 
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how internet policy, or the regulation of social media, may bear indirect fruit 






This essay began by noting that (over)reliance on intellectual property 
incentives can often lead to underinvestment in vaccine R&D because of 
limited prospects of return-on-investment. It ends by pointing out that, if 
adoption of COVID-19 vaccines is low, this might have a detrimental effect 
on incentives to R&D on other pathogens causing emerging infectious 
diseases—at least in a world in which patent-driven frameworks remain 
dominant. Hopefully some of the solutions surveyed in Part III can be 
further developed and improved upon as we learn from the COVID-19 
pandemic and tweak existing preparedness frameworks for upcoming 
outbreaks of infectious diseases.
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